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Comments
GCm Iw,L LAw-ABoRTIoN--MAN, BEING WrrTouT A LEGAL BEGINNING.
On May 10, 1966, a Mexican physician, unlicensed in California, per-
formed an abortion on an unmarried woman in a Los Angeles apart-
ment. The woman had been referred to him by Leon Phillip Belous,
a physician licensed since 1931 and a Board-certified obstetrician and
gynecologist practicing in Beverly Hills. Dr. Belous was convicted in
the Superior Court of Los Angeles County of conspiring to commit
abortion and of abortion. His conviction was sustained by the Court
of Appeals for the Second District,' and Dr. Belous appealed to the
Supreme Court of California. Held: Reversed. The pre-1967 California
abortion statute2 making a person who performs abortion punishable
unless abortion is "necessary to preserve the woman's life" is not
susceptible of a construction that is sufficiently certain to satisfy
due process requirements without improperly infringing on the funda-
mental constitutional rights of the woman. People v. Belous, 17 Cal.
App. 966, 458 P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969), cert. denied, 38
U.S.L.W. 8813 (U.S. 1970).
Belous has been hailed as the most significant opinion on abortion
in Anglo-American jurisprudence since the inception in 18033 of the
I2d App. Dist., Div. 3, 2d. Crim. No. 13618, filed Aug. 13, 1968.
2CjA. PmAL CODE § 274 (Stats. 1872, amended Stats. 1935):
Every person who provides, supplies or administers to any woman, or
procures any woman to take any medicine, drug, or substance, or uses
or employs any instrument or other means whatever, with intent thereby
to procure the miscarriage of such woman, unless the same is necessary
to preserve her life, is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison
for not less than two nor more than five years. (emphasis added).
In 1967, § 274 was amended and reads in part:
Every person who provides, supplies, or administers to any woman, or
procures any woman to take any medicine, drug, or substance, or uses
or employs any instrument or other means whatever, with intent thereby
to procure the miscarriage of such woman, . . . except as provided in
the Therapeutic Abortion Act ...of the Health and Safety Code, is
punishable by imprisonment in the state prison... Stats. 1967, ch. 327
§ 3, at 1523. (emphasis added).
The Therapeutic Abortion Act, Health & S.C. § 2590-2594 (Stats. 1967), permits
termination of pregnancy where its continuation would present substantial risk
of danger to the physical or mental health of the woman, or where the preg-
nancy was conceived by sexual assault (rape or incest); requires abortion to be
performed in an accredited hospital by licensed physician, purusant to approval
of the hospital therapeutic abortion committee; provides time limits within which
pregnancy may be terminated; provides for notification and/or approval of District
Attorney or Superior Court where pregnancy resulted from sexual assault. Since
this act was adopted after the abortion involved in the Belous case, the Court
would not direct itself to the issues involving the later act's validity.
a Lord Ellenborough's Act, 43 GEo. III, ch. 58, § 2 at 758 (1803).
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anti-abortion statutes. 4 It comes at a time when abortion has emerged
as an issue of open national debate. It is generally estimated that one
million illegal abortions are performed annually in the United States.5
In 1969 alone, 350,000 women were hospitalized after injurious
abortion attempts and more than 8,000 of them died.' While these
facts alone do not support immediate repeal of our anti-abortion laws,7
they do demand re-evaluation in light of contemporary social mores
and medical science.
In Belous, the Supreme Court of California was reviewing the
violation of a statute" which was substantially unchanged since its
enactment in 1850.9 Judicial notice was taken of the fact that surgery,
and hospital procedures in general, in the nineteenth century were
primitive and dangerous. Legislatures may therefore have been
justified in restricting abortion to the preservation of the woman's
life.' However, the Court determined that twentieth century ad-
vances in medical science and practice had rendered such a legislative
purpose obsolete." The Court found persuasive precedent in the
1959 California decision of People v. Ballard2 which stated:
Surely, the abortion statute (Pen. Code § 274) does not mean by
the word 'unless the same is necessary to preserve her life' that
the peril to life be imminent. It ought to be enough that the
dangerous condition be potentially present, even though its full
4 Leavey, Current Developments in the Law of Abortion: 1969-A Landmark
Year, 45 LAB. BuLL. 11 (1969).
5 Abortion Legislation: The Need for Reform, 20 VAN. L. 11Ev. 1313 (1967).
One source goes so far as to say, "It is probable that the majority of therapeutic
abortions in the United States are illegal." Kutner, Due Process of Abortion, 53
MmN. L. REv. 1, 8 (1969) (emphasis added).
6 Abortion Comes Out of the Shadows, Lam, Feb. 27, 1970, Vol. 68, at 7.
7For example, the laws against theft were violated in 1966 by 762,352 cases
of larceny of amounts over $50.00 known to the police, and 486,568 cases of
auto theft known to the police. U. S. DEP"T oF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABsTRACr
OF THE U.S. 149 (1967). Yet these figures are hardly arguments for the repeal
of laws prohibiting theft.8 CAL. PENAL CoDE § 274 (West 1957).
9 It is important to note that approximately thirty states have anti-abortion
laws similar to California's pre-1967 statute. See Ziff, Recent Abortion Law Re-
forms, 60 J. Crn. L.C. & P.S. 3 (1969).
"0 Abortion and the Changing Law, NEwsw=n, April 13, 1970:
In early nineteenth century New York, for example, the mortality from
major surgery averaged 38 per cent, but only 2 per cent of women diedduring childbirth. Now the situation is different; there are twenty deaths
for every 100,000 live births in the U.S., but only three for every i00,00
in-hospital abortions performed under thebest of circumstances. Id. at 55.
"Brif fr Mdicl Shoo Dens a Aiicu Cuiaein upprt f Appellant,
Peopl .Blu,7 a.App 6,48P2 9 0Cl 1~ 354 (1969).
Thisbrif ws sgne by178dean ofmedcalschols~ououtthe United
States icdigtedasoalCaionamdlchl, adarged that
anti-abortion laws have created a greater health problem than they were ever
designed to cure. The brief estimated 30,000 to 100,00 criminal abortions an-
nually n California-this being the greatest single cause of maternal mortality.
12 167 Cal. App. 2d 803, 335 P.2d 204, -Cal. Rptr.- (1959).
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development might be delayed to a greater or lesser extent.
Nor was it essential that the doctor should believe that the death of
the patient would be otherwise certain in order to justify him in
affording present relief.18
But the importance and impact of the Belous case goes beyond the
considerations of medical advances in surgical safety. It goes beyond
considerations of the woman's health. In denying the validity of
requiring great danger to the expectant mother as a precondition to
lawful abortion, the California Supreme Court recognized as a funda-
mental constitutional right the prerogative of a woman to choose
whether to bear children 14 and-for the first time-extended that right
to include the first three months of pregnancy:
In the light of modern medical surgical practice, the great and
direct infringement of constitutional rights which would result
from a definition requiring certainty of death may not be justi-
fied on the basis of consideration of the woman's health where, as
here, abortion is sought during the first trimester. 15
In the Roman Empire, the basic concept of the law was that a
fetus is part of the woman. Abortion with the consent of the father
was legal.1 At English common law, human life did not have its
l Id. at 814, 335 P.2d at 212, - Cal. Rptr. at -. The reasonableness of
such a holding is persuasive:
Few pre ancies carry an imminent risk to life but a number of them
threaten ,lie by a substantial impairment of heafth; therefore, to balance
a mother's interest in being free from a life-shortening disease against the
fetus' interest in life may not overstep the constitutional line. Analogy
is afforded by the usual rule treating as justifiable homicide killing done
to repel a threat of substantial bodily injury. A rule of self-preservation
where life is balanced against life does not offend the respect which the
constitution demands for the life of every person. Noonan, Constitution-
ality of the Regulation of Abortion, 21 HAs-mINs L. J. 51, 61 (1969).
14 The Belous Court reasoned:
The fundamental right of the woman to choose whether to bear children
follows from the Supreme Court's and this court's repeated acknowledg-
ment of a 'right of privacy' or 'liberty' in matters related to marriage,
family, and sex. (See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, supra, 381 U.S. 479,
485, 486, 500, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510- Loving v. Virginia (1967)
388 U.S. 1, 12, 87 S.Ct. 1817, 18 L.Ed.2d 1010 [statute prohibiting
interracial marriages, violative of Due Process Clause]; Skinner v. Okla-
homa ex rel. Williamson (1942) 316 U.S. 535, 536, 541, 62 S.Ct. 1110,
86 L.Ed. 1655 [sterilization laws; marriage and procreation involve a
"basic liberty"]; Pierce v. Society of Sisters (1925) 268 U.S. 510, 534-
535, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070, 39 A.L.R. 468 [prohibition against
nonpublic schools; same]; Meyer v. Nebraska (1923) 262 U.S. 390,
199-400, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042 [prohibition against teaching chil-
dren German language; same]- Perez v. Sharp, 32 Cal. App.2d 711, 715,
198 P.2d 17; see also Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App.2d 303, 317-
318, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463.). 71 Cal. App. at -, 458 P.2d at 199-200, 80
Cal. Rptr. at 359-60.
15 Id. at -, 458 P.2d at 202, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 362.
16 JusTINIA, DIGEsr Ch. 25 § 4, 1 (1).
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legal beginning until the time of "quickening" 7 i.e., the first time the
fetus was felt to stir in the womb.'8 And while the American states
outlawed all abortion in the nineteenth century,19 in 1884 Justice
Holmes enunciated in Dietrich v. Inhabitants of NorthhamptoP20 a
rule which was followed by the courts for some time-that a child has
no cause of action against a third person to recover for damages
wrongfully inflicted on it in the womb, on the theory that when the
injury was inflicted, the fetus was a vegetating part of the mother and
not a separate individual to whom legal duties were owed. Such
reasoning is implicit in the Belous decision. Incidental to her consti-
tutional right to life and to choose whether to bear children, and not
unlike her right to use contraceptives, the Belous court said that a
woman has the fundamental right to terminate pregnancy in the first
trimester.n 21
But what of the fetus? Herein lies the crucial question for consider-
17The American Law Institute implicitly readopted the common law theory
of "quickening" as a basis for the liberalized Model Penal Code provision on
abortion:
As the fetus develops to the point where it is recognizable in human form
(4-6 weeks) or manifests life by movements perceptible to the mother
at "quickening" (14-20 weeks) or becomes "viable', or capable of sur-
viving though born prematurely (24-28 weeks) it increasingly evokes
in the greater portion of mankind a feeling of sympathy as with a fel-
low human being so the destruction comes to be regarded by many as
equivalent to murder .... [But] most abortions occur prior to the fourth
month of pregnancy, before the fetus becomes firmly implanted in the
womb, before it develops many of the characteristics and recognizable
features of humanity, and well before it is capable of those movements,
which when felt by the mother are called "quickening." . . . [T]here
seems to be an obvious difference between terminating the develop-
ment of such an inchoate being whose chance of maturing is still
somewhat problematical, and on the other hand, destroying a fully
formed viable fetus of eight months, where the offense may well become
murder.... MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.11, Comment (1959).
18 Means, The Law of New York Concerning Abortion and the Status of the
Foetus, 1664-1968: A Case of Cessation of Constitutionality, 14 N.Y.L.F. 411,
419-22 (1968).
19 See J. BIsHoP, Comnv=Arrms ON THE LAW OF STATUTORY Cn s § 746
(2d ed. 1883).
20 138 Mass. 14, 17 (1884). As recently as 1921, Justice Pound subscribed
to this view: "In the mother's womb he [the infant] bad no separate existence
of his own. He carried the injuries out into the world with him. His full rights
as a human being spring into existence with his birth." Drobner v. Peters, 232
N.Y. 220, 223, 133 N.E. 567, 568 (1921).
21 A recent treatise would support such reasoning:
... [Tlhe early fetus, similar in shape and functioning to the con-
stituents which came together to form it, bears scarcely any developed
characteristics at the time abortion normally takes place. If life trans-
mission is recognized as a continuous process in which conception
plays only the part of increasing and re-directing growth, contraception
and abortion differ only in degree. Both are employed to prevent a
birth several months in the future. Lucas, Federal Constitutional Limi-
tations On The Enforcement And Administration Of State Abortion
Statutes, 46 N.C. L. REv. 730, 764 (1968).
[Vol. 58
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ation in determining the worth and validity of the Belous decision:
When does the marital right to plan children end, and the right of
the fetus to life begin? While there has been a discernable trend to-
ward increased freedom for women and privacy for the family, has
there been no change in our medical and legal concept of the nature
of prenatal existence? As the Court in Belous itself asserted, "Consti-
tutional concepts are not static."
22
As early as 1946 in the case of Bonbrest v. Kotz,2 3 a federal dis-
trict court rejected the Dietrich l1e2 4 of Justice Holmes and permitted
a recovery for a prenatal injury. The court reasoned:
The law is presumed to keep pace with the sciences and medical
science certainly has made progress since 1884 .... From the
viewpoint of the civil law and the law of property, a child en
ventre sa mere is not only regarded as a human being, but as
such from the moment of conception-which it is in fact.
25
In 1964, a pregnant woman's right to freely practice her religion
came into conflict with the asserted right of the fetus to life. The
court held for the fetus in Raleigh-Fitkin-Paul Memorial Hospital v.
Anderson:
26
In State v. Perricone, 37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751 (1962), we held
that the State's concern for the welfare of an infant justified blood
transfusions notwithstanding the objection of its parents who were
also Jehovah's Witnesses. And in Smith v. Brenan, 31 N.J. 353,
157 A.2d 497 (1960), we held that a child could sue for injuries
negligently inflicted upon it prior to birth. We are satisfied that
the unborn child is entitled to the law's protection and that an ap-
propriate order could be made to insure blood transfusions to
the mother in the event that they are necessary in the opinion of
the physician in charge at the time.2
2271 Cal. App. at -, 458 P.2d at 202, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 362.
23 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
24The fetus is part of the mother and therefore not deserving of legal
protection. Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884).2
6fBonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138, 143 (D.D.C. 1946). Herein lay the
begi.nn of what has been called "the most spectacular abrupt reversal of a
well settled rule in the whole history of the law of torts." W. Paossmi, LAw oF
ToRTs § 56 (3d ed. 1964). See e.g., Torrigian v. Watertown News Co., 352
Mass. 446, 225 N.E.2d 926 (1927) (recovery for 3V month old fetus under
wrongful death statute); Sinkler v. Kneale, 401 Pa. 26, 164 A.2d 93 (1960) (re-
covery for 1 month old fetus).
This development in tort law is cited as a prime example of scientific progress
affecting the law in E. PATrEsoN, LAw IN A SCmNm ic Ac.E (1963): "...
[T]he meaning and scope of even such a basic term as 'legal person' can be
modified by reason of changes in scientific facts-the unborn child has beenrecogni"ed as a legal person, even in the law of torts." Id. at 35.
2042 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537 (1964).
-n Id. at 423, 201 A.2d at 538.
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Subsequently the New Jersey Supreme Court was called upon to
apply this holding in a case involving the fetus' right not to be
aborted. Gleitman v. Cosgrove2 8 was an action for money damages
brought by a husband and wife on behalf of themselves and their
child against two doctors on the allegation that their child had been
born with physical defects after the defendants had negligently
failed to warn them that an attack of German measles, or rubella,
which Mrs. Gleitman had suffered during pregnancy, might result in
such defects. The failure to give the warning allegedly deprived the
parties of an opportunity to terminate the pregnancy by abortion.
In its 1967 decision, the court emphasized the unborn child's right
to life:
The right to life is inalienable in our society . . . . We are not
faced here with the necessity of balancing the mother's life against
that of her child. The sanctity of the single human life is the
decisive factor in this suit . . . It may have been easier for the
mother and less expensive for the father to have terminated the life
of their child while he was an embryo, but these alleged detri-
ments cannot stand against the preciousness of the single human
life .... The right of their child to live is greater than and pre-
cludes their right not to endure emotional and financial injury ....
A claim for them would be precluded by the countervailing
public policy suporting the preciousness of human life.2 9
Certainly, case law affords a ready brush to paint the preferred picture.
To be determined is whether the above cited cases reflect a Pick-
wickian approach, making somthing that does not exist in nature
exist in law, or a true evolution in the law that responds to current
medical and biological data.
Today the evolution favoring the greater freedom of women in
matters of conception encounters the evolution favoring recognition
of the fetus as a living, human person. The various rights hitherto
conferred on the fetus by case law and statute are conferred on a
being inherently distinct from the spermatozoon and ovum that con-
stitute its origin.80
28 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967).
29 Id. at 30, 227 A.2d at 693. Public interest in the issue of abortion was
dramatically crystallized by the German measles epidemic of 1963-64, blamed for
the birth of some 30,000 U.S. infants with congenital defects. Today, the threat of
German measles, rubella, has been greatly reduced not only by prosective sta-
tistical evaluation and prophylactic treatment with gamma globulin but also by
the new vaccine, meruvox, which is produced by Merk and Co. and the Philips-
Roxane vaccine produced in canine-kidney cells. Ray & Deutach The Congenital
Rubella Syndrome-Ocular Pathogeneis and Related Embryology, 62 Am J.
OPraL. 236 (1969).
a0 Noonan, supra note 13, at 51-52.
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The newly conceived fetus possesses something not possessed by
its individual components, the genetic (DNA) code, which trans-
mits the human constitution. At the same time, this new being
represents a dramatic jump in potentiality for survival. Of the ap-
proximately two million spermatozoa in a normal ejaculation,
only one has a chance of developing into a zygote, and of the one
million oocytes in a female at birth, 390 at most have a chance of
becoming ova, but once spermatozoon and ovum meet and the
conceptus is formed, there is an 80 per cent chance that unless
deliberately aborted, the being will be delivered as a living
child. It is understandable then, that the law, looking at this new
being who has such a high probability of life, has recognized the
fetus as a possessor of rights and interests.
Furthermore, the new science of fetology, originating in Liley's work
on blood transfusions to the fetus, has offered man a hitherto un-
explored mirror of his earliest growth and development:
The head, housing the miraculous brain, is quite large in pro-
portion to the remainder of the body, and the limbs are still
relatively small. Within his watery world, however (where we
have been able to observe him in his natural state through a sort
of closed circuit x-ray television set), he is quite beautiful,
perfect in his fashion, active and graceful. He is neither a quies-
cent vegetable nor a witless tadpole, as some have conceived him
to be in the past, but rather a tiny human being, as independent
as though he were lying in a crib with a blanket wrapped around
him instead of his mother.3 1
The Belous court cannot be faulted in recognizing as a funda-
mental, constitutional right the woman's prerogative to choose whether
to become impregnated. But in extending this right of choice beyond
conception to include the first trimester of pregnancy, the California
Supreme Court failed to confront and adequately consider recent
advances in the area of fetology. For in the light of ever-increasing,
scientific evidence, the fetus must be seen as physically and intel-
lectually in a continuum with postnatal humanity. The issue is not
31 H. Liley, MODERN MOTHERHOOD 26-27 (1967). See also Gesell, THE
FnsT FvE YEARS OF LiF (1940):
[Miental growth is a process of behavior patterning.... [E]ven in
the limb bud stage, when the embryo is only four weeks old, there is
evidence of behavior patterning: the heart beats. In two more weeks
slow back and forth movements of arms and limbs appear. Before the
twelfth week of uterine life the fingers flex in reflex grasps. Id. at 11.
It is now recognized that:
... [T]he nine months spent by the individual in the womb are funda-
mental. It is during these nine prenatal months, that the individual's
foundations are . . . laid.... To an extent rather more profound than
we bad hitherto suspected, the individual's prenatal past influences his
postnatal future. A. Montague, PRENATAL IFLuENCE 500 (1962).
1970]
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one of contraception,32 but one of conception and the paramount right
to life that attaches thereto.
As early as 1949, the Virginia Supreme Court viewed anti-abortion
legislation in this perspective: "Anti-abortion statutes are enacted,
not only for protection of the woman, but for protection of the
unborn child and society . . ."33 However intimidating the population
bomb may become, however deafening the public clamor for open
abortion,34 the courts cannot properly abandon the fetus to the whim
of circumstances-even in the first three months of gestation. Reason,
not rationalization, must be the guardian of human life.
William T. Robinson III
UNnom C omccA.L CoDE-AssiGNmENTs-CoNDoroNAL SAims CoN-
TRAcrs-WAivEa OF DEFENSE CAusE.-O. G. Jennings purchased a car
from an automobile dealer under a conditional sales contract which
embodied a "waiver of defense or counterclaim" clause.1 The contract
received the customary treatment of such agreements, assignment to
a finance company. Apparently upon default of payments, the as-
signee repossessed and sold the car, bringing suit against Jennings to
recover the deficiency on the unpaid balance. The trial court granted
summary judgment for the assignee, disallowing a counterclaim that
the retailer had delivered a used car misrepresented as a new one.
2
3 2 Lucas, supra note 21.
33 Miller v. Bennet, 190 Va. 162 -. 56 S.E.2d 217, 221 (1949).
34 The trend of public opinion is clear:
Whatever the underlying motivation, public attitudes about abortion
have changed ra idly. In 1967, a Gallup poll showed that 21 percent of
Americans felt abortion should be permitted for any woman wanting
one. In a Gallup study last year, four out of ten persons said they re-
garded abortion as a private matter between a woman and her doctor.
Abortion and the Changing Law, NEwswEE, April 13, 1970, at 54.
1 It is standard procedure for car dealers to include "waiver" clauses in condi-
tional sales contracts. To obtain enough ready cash to restore inventory, dealers
assign (sell) their right to collect under a sales contract to financial institutions at
a discount. The following clause was embodied in the sales contract of the in-
stant case: I
If Seller assigns this contract, Seller shall not be assignee's agent for
transmission of payments or for any purpose; Customer will settle, directly
with Seller, all claims, defenses, set-offs and counterclaims there may
be against Seller, and not set up any thereof against assignee. Upon
full payment of Customer's obligation, assignee may deliver all original
papers, including any certificate of title to Seller as Customer's agent.
442 S.W.2d at 566.
2 The effect of the UmurOmi Co m.ciAL CoDE [hereinafter UCC in the
footnotes] § 9-206(1), which provides for the use of "waiver" clauses, is to make
the assignee of the contract the holder in due course of a negotiable instrument.
As such, he is free from certain "personal" defenses such as a failure of consi-
deration. Receiving a used rather than a new car is a failure of consideration.
See UCC § 3-305.
[Vol. 58
